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I. Introduction 
Although stock markets are far better regulated today than in the nineteenth 
century, market manipulations by large investors and insiders still occur around the world.  
Most recently, in August 2004, Citigroup sold more than 200 different Eurozone bonds in 
the space of 2 minutes.  After the price fell they bought some back again at lower prices.  
They are thought to have netted €15 million.1  This action reduced the subsequent liquidity 
of the market significantly.  In May 1991, a bond trader at Salomon Brothers was 
discovered attempting to corner the market in two-year U.S. Treasury notes.2  During the 
1990s bull market, numerous price manipulation schemes for penny stocks were 
discovered by the SEC.3  Manipulation knows no international borders. In 2002, China's 
worst stock-market crime was a scheme to manipulate the share price of a firm called 
China Venture Capital.  Seven people, including two of the firm’s former executives, were 
accused of using $700 million and 1,500 brokerage accounts nationwide to manipulate the 
company share price.  Krugman (1996) also reported a price manipulation in the copper 
market by a rogue trader at the Japanese trading firm Sumitomo.  
There is a small but growing theoretical literature on market manipulation.  Hart 
(1977), Hart and Kreps (1986), Vila (1987, 1989), Allen and Gale (1992), Allen and 
Gorton (1992), Benabou and Laroque (1992), and Jarrow (1992, 1994) were among the 
first to study market manipulation.  Cherian and Jarrow (1995) survey this early literature.  
Subsequent contributions include Bagnoli and Lipman (1996), Chakraborty and Yilmaz 
(2003, 2004), and Goldstein and Guembel (2003).  Kumar and Seppi (1992) discuss the 
possibility of futures manipulation with cash settlement. Pirrong (1993) shows how 
squeezes hinder price discovery and create deadweight losses. Vitale (2000) considers 
manipulation in foreign exchange markets.  Van Bommel (2003) shows the role of rumors 
in facilitating price manipulation. 
In contrast, the empirical literature is quite limited.  Although the wide-spread 
manipulation through stock pools before the Crash of 1929 is vividly documented in 
Galbraith (1972), Mahoney (1999) and Jiang, Mahoney, and Mei (2004) find little 
                                                 
1 See the Financial Times, September 10, 2004, p. 11. 
2 See Jegadeesh (1993) and Jordan and Jordan (1996) for detailed studies on the Treasury auction bids and 
the Salomon price squeeze. 
3 For example, the SEC intervened in 1996 when the share price of Comparator Systems Corporation (a 
finger print identification company with net assets of less than $2 million) soared from 3 cents to $1.03, 
valuing the company at a market capitalization of over a billion dollars. An astonishing 180 million 
Comparator shares were traded on the Nasdaq Exchange on May 6, 1996. See also Aggarwal and Wu (2003).  
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evidence of price manipulation for the stock pools.  However, there are a few recent 
studies that have found evidence of market manipulation.  Aggarwal and Wu (2003) 
present a theory and some empirical evidence on stock price manipulation in the United 
States.  Extending the framework of Allen and Gale (1992), they show that more 
information seekers imply greater competition for shares in a market with manipulators, 
making it easier for a manipulator to enter the market and potentially worsen market 
efficiency.  Using a unique dataset from SEC actions in cases of stock manipulation, they 
find that more illiquid stocks are more likely to be manipulated and manipulation increases 
stock volatility.  Khwaja and Mian (2004) discover evidence of broker price manipulation 
by using a unique daily trade level data set from the main stock market in Pakistan.  They 
find that brokers earn at least 8% higher returns on their own trades.  While neither market 
timing nor liquidity provision offer sufficient explanations for this result, they find 
compelling evidence for a specific trade-based “pump-and-dump” price manipulation 
scheme.  Merrick, Nain and Yadav (2004) provide empirical evidence on learning in the 
market place and on the strategic behavior of market participants by studying an attempted 
delivery squeeze in the March 1998 long-term UK government bond futures contract 
traded on the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE).  
Felixon and Pelli (1999) test for closing price manipulation in the Finnish stock market and 
find evidence of it.  They find that block trades and spread trades explained a part, but not 
all of the observed manipulation.  Mei, Wu and Zhou (2004) construct a theoretical 
example in which smart money strategically takes advantage of investors’ behavioral 
biases and manipulates the price process to make profit.  As an empirical test, the paper 
presents some empirical evidence from the U.S. SEC prosecution of “pump-and-dump” 
manipulation cases.  The findings from these cases are consistent with their model.  
 This paper fills a gap in the manipulation literature by providing a clinical study on 
a particular form of manipulation - market corners from the robber-baron era to the Great 
Depression of 1929 to the 1980s.4  We make several contributions to the literature on 
market manipulation: first, we have put together by hand a novel data set of price and 
trading volume based on historical newspapers from the New York Times and the Wall 
Street Journal from 1863-1980.  This allows us to provide the first systematic account of 
some well-known market corners in US financial history.  Second, we present some unique 
                                                 
4 Jarrow (1992) provides a collection of early references on attempted corners in individual common stocks. 
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evidence on the price and volume patterns of successful corners.  We show that market 
corners tend to increase market volatility and have an adverse price impact on other assets.  
Third, we demonstrate that the presence of large investors makes it extremely risky for 
short sellers to trade against mispricing in the stock market.  This creates severe limits to 
arbitrage in the stock market that impede market efficiency.  Therefore, regulators and 
exchanges need to ensure that corners do not take place since they are accompanied by 
severe price distortions. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section II considers the data and 
institutional background.  The empirical results are presented in Section III.  Section IV 
contains concluding remarks. 
 
II. Historical Data and Institutional Background 
One of the main hurdles in studying market manipulation is that the data are hard to 
obtain since the activity is often illegal and thus the participants do their best to hide it.  
Aggarwal and Wu (2003) and Mei, Wu and Zhou (2004) get around this problem by using 
prosecution cases filed by the SEC.  This paper overcomes the hurdle by looking at a 
special form of manipulation - market corners.  We identify market corners by going 
through the stock market chronology compiled by Wyckoff (1972).  He defines a corner as 
“a market condition brought about intentionally - though sometimes accidentally - when 
virtually all of the purchasable, or floating, supply of a company’s stock is held by an 
individual, or group, who are thus able to dictate the price when settlement is called.”  
Thus, a corner is an extreme form of short squeeze, when the buy side has almost complete 
control of all floating shares.  
We check all the corners reported by Wyckoff (1972) using reports by Brooks 
(1969), Clews (1888), Sobel (1865), Stedman (1905), and Thomas (1989).  We eliminate 
those that cannot be verified independently and we restrict our cases to those that happened 
between 1863 and 1928, because trading data were not available before 1863.  The New 
York Stock Exchange passed rules to discourage market corners in 1920, after which only 
one corner was reported (Piggly-Wiggly) while the RCA corner in 1928 was unplanned.5  
This gives a total of thirteen reported cases of stock corners.  In addition, we also include 
                                                 
5 Strictly speaking, the RCA corner is more like a short squeeze because no settlement was called. The reason 
we included it is because the manipulator Durant was reported to have controlled the whole float.  
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the case of the failed silver corner of the Hunt brothers in 1980.  The corners considered 
are shown in Table 1. 
We hand-collected the data set of price and trading volume from the New York 
Times and we use the Wall Street Journal to search for information that is missing due to 
the poor publication quality of historical newspapers.  This is a laborious process since we 
also need to aggregate trade-by-trade information in order to get daily price and trading 
volume.6  Based on Wyckoff’s definition, we break corners into two categories: successful 
and failed corners.  Successful corners are those where the manipulator controlled almost 
all of the floating shares during the short squeeze and was able to dictate prices.  Failed 
corners are those where the manipulators attempted but failed to control the large amount 
of floating shares either because of large amounts of new shares that were brought to the 
market on the settlement date or because of government action.  The corner dates are 
determined based on either the settlement call made by the manipulators or government 
action dates.  Appendix A provides a brief account of most of the corners while Appendix 
B provides a graphical depiction of trading activity around the corner dates.  
 There are several common features of these corners.  First of all, most corners 
involved the robber-barons of the time, namely, Jay Gould, Daniel Drew, Jim Fisk, 
Cornelius Vanderbilt, and J. P. Morgan.  Many of them were in a special position to 
exploit unwary investors - in many cases they were corporate officers/insiders as well as 
large stockholders.7  Second, manipulators often controlled a huge amount of the common 
shares, often exceeding the whole float at the time of settlement, which put them in a 
position to dictate the settlement price to the short sellers.  Third, stock prices tend to be 
discontinuous for cornered stocks, often with large price jumps around the corner date, 
suggesting major disruptions to an orderly market.  Fourth, the amount of wealth 
controlled by the manipulators was large compared to the market cap of the stock.8  
                                                 
6 Unfortunately, while the New York Times reports every trade for each stock before 1900, the trades were 
not time-stamped so that we cannot perform microstructure studies.  
7 For example, as director of Erie, Drew had used his position to issue new shares to cover his short position. 
He also had hidden convertible bonds that were unknown to the market but were convertible to common 
when he was cornered.  
8 According to Gordon (1999), Vanderbilt put together a stock pool of $5 million in cash to operate the 
second Harlem corner. At the time, he already owned a big chunk of Harlem stocks due to the first Harlem 
corner. On March 29, 1864, Harlem had a market capitalization of $11.9million with 110,000 shares 
outstanding.  By the end of April, Vanderbilt and his allies owned 137,000 shares, with the difference sold to 
them by the short sellers. At time of his death in 1877, Vanderbilt left an estate that was worth $90 million. 
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The presence of deep-pocketed manipulators makes short-selling an extremely 
hazardous venture for would-be arbitrageurs.  The oldest and most sacred rule of Wall 
Street at the time was “He who sells what isn’t his, Must buy it back or go to prison.”  As 
pointed out by Jones and Lamont (2002), there are two main risks for short sellers: first, 
short sellers are required to post additional collateral if the price of the shorted stock rises. 
Second, stock loans can be called at the discretion of the lender, giving rise to recall risk.  
Manipulation will exacerbate the above risks and add some new risks to the 
arbitrageurs.  First of all, when manipulators are better informed about the supply of 
shares, the short sellers are more likely to close their position at a loss.  The lender of the 
stock would demand the return of her shares at the worst possible time.  The stock lender/ 
manipulator will call in her loan when the shares have risen in price and the short sellers 
are unable to find shares to borrow.  Second, deep-pocketed manipulators will be able to 
drive stock prices to the point where short sellers would not be able to post additional 
collateral and thus have to close their position at a loss.  Third, the price jumps during a 
market corner create a huge operational risk for brokers who arrange stock borrowing for 
short sellers.  In the event of a market corner, large jumps in stock price could easily wipe 
out the collateral put up by short sellers and lead to severe financial losses for the broker in 
the event of short seller default.9  In this case, because of lack of liquidity in the market, it 
may be difficult for brokers to protect themselves by closing short-sellers’ position. 
 
III. Empirical Results 
The data for this study is collected from historical records of the New York Times 
and The Wall Street Journal (see Table 1 for the corresponding time periods).  Nine of the 
documented corners took place in the second half of the nineteenth century and five took 
place throughout the twentieth century.  A concise historical reference on each of these 
corners is presented in Appendix A.  In the process of building the historical trading 
database we have aggregated intra-day transactions on a daily basis.  A small number of 
records (trading days) were inaccessible and thus are not reported.  
We start with brief descriptive statistics for the companies in our sample.  We 
examine daily returns, volatility, autocorrelation, price dispersion, and trading volume.  
                                                 
9 In the second Harlem corner, Vanderbilt was so furious at the short sellers that he was reported planning to 
drive the stock price to $1,000. But he dropped his plan after leaning that it would bankrupt almost all 
brokerage firms on the street. See Clews (1888), chapter 34. 
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We conduct this analysis for the pre-corner period, as well as in two corner sub-periods: 
corner period one - ten days before the corner to the corner date, and corner period two – 
the day after the corner date to ten days following it.  We present descriptive statistics for 
the returns for these periods in Table 2.10  Notice that there is a significant increase in 
returns during corner period one (3.3%) as compared to the pre-corner period (0.4%), and a 
subsequent decline in returns in corner period two (-2.9%).  One notable example is the 
Northwestern market corner - in the first corner sub-period daily returns were 9.3% on 
average, while in the post-corner period the average daily return was –12%.  The return is 
continuously compounded for the duration of the corner period and is computed using the 
closing price.  
There is a significant increase in the volatility of returns in both corner periods 
(6.6% for corner period one, and 6.3% for corner period two) as compared with the pre-
corner period (2.9%).  Another indicator of interest is the increased price dispersion (7.5% 
for corner period one, and 4% for corner period two as compared to the periods before the 
corner 2.9%).  Price dispersion is defined as the daily spread between high and low as a 
percentage of the close price.  The evidence on the impact of the market corner on price 
dispersion is consistent with the hypothesis that there exists significant private information 
trading in the run-up to the corner – as a result the price dispersion increases in the first 
period preceding the corner, while it substantially decreases in the period after the corner.  
For example in the corner of Northern Pacific price dispersion prior to the corner period is 
on average 1.9% daily.  However, in the first corner sub-period, the price dispersion 
increases to 24.9% only to retreat to the low 3.2% following the corner.  
Table 2 also shows a significant change in trading volume between the pre-corner 
and the corner periods.  For example, the average daily share turnover has increased 
between pre-corner period to corner period one from 79,734 shares for RCA to more than 
182,664, or from 37,645 to 119,263 for Northern Pacific, or from 7,602 to 14,407 for the 
second Erie corner.  Even more spectacular was the dry-up of liquidity after the corner date 
for some stocks, e.g. a decrease from 119,263 shares in corner period one to 980 shares in 
corner period two for Northern Pacific.  Figure 1 provides graphic plots of changing 
liquidity (we use cumulative abnormal trading volume as a proxy).  The abnormal trading 
volume is defined as the difference between daily volume in the corner period and average 
                                                 
10 The pre-corner periods have unequal length. See Table 2 for the precise length of each pre-corner period. 
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daily trading volume in the pre-corner period.  We standardize this variable with the 
standard deviation of the pre-corner period daily volume.  In the figure, we have 
accumulated the trading volume across the corner period, i.e. at day t–10 (i.e. ten days 
prior to the corner date) we have plotted the abnormal trading volume at that date; at day t–
9 we have plotted the sum of the abnormal trading volume at days t–10 and t–9, etc. 
A clear pattern of increased turnover and subsequent volume dry-up is displayed in 
Figure 1.  However, the pattern of liquidity impact differs across successful and failed 
corners, apparently being stronger for the successful corners as compared to the failed 
ones.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that market corners have a considerable 
impact on the liquidity of the cornered stock.  
In Table 2, we analyze autocorrelation patterns.  There seems to be a significant 
change in autocorrelation of returns between pre-corner and corner periods.  In the first 
corner period we notice positive autocorrelation of 11.1%, as compared with the second 
corner sub-period, where the autocorrelation is –5.7%.  Both of these correlations are 
higher in absolute terms than the pre-corner autocorrelation of –1%.  If autocorrelation is 
to be considered a proxy for the presence of private information trading conditional on 
high trading volume, we indeed witness an unprecedented increase in the pre-corner period 
informed trading.  Upon completion of the corner, autocorrelations decline to become 
negative in eight of the twelve corners for which we have available post-corner data.  
These results are consistent with the theoretical findings of Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and 
Wang (2002) on private information trading during the corner period and liquidity trading 
afterwards. 
In Table 3 we record the abnormal standardized daily returns in the [t-10, t+10] day 
event window around the corner date.11  Standardized abnormal return is defined as the 
daily stock return in the corner periods in excess of the average daily return in the pre-
corner period, scaled by the standard deviation of the pre-corner daily return (both the 
standard deviation and the mean for the pre-corner period are shown in Table 2).  Notice 
that the mean of the abnormal standardized return is usually positive in the [t-10, t] period, 
and negative in the [t+1, t+10] period.  This effect is more pronounced for successful 
corners as compared to failed ones.  The two types of corners differ most significantly on 
                                                 
11 We have attempted to collect a comprehensive data set for the entire event period however for five stocks 
we could not uncover all trading data. For two of them, Prairie du Chien and Northern Pacific we have 
missing data for seven and six trading days, respectively.  
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the day of the corner with successful corners recording an average gain of 7.6 standard 
deviations above the pre-corner mean and failed corners recording a loss of 3.3 standard 
deviations below the pre-corner average.  For both successful and failed corners abnormal 
standardized returns following the corner are negative, but more so for successful corners.  
We display this pattern by presenting the cumulative abnormal returns in the event period 
in Figure 2.  Clearly there is an increase in the returns around the corner date for both 
successful and failed corners.   
In Table 4 we present a comparison of successful and failed corners. The 
comparison is on standardized abnormal returns, trading volume, price dispersion, and 
excess return.  The daily excess return is defined as the residual of the Black version of the 
CAPM model within the corner period, where the CAPM coefficients have been estimated 
from the pre-corner period.  The reason we use the Black version of the CAPM is the lack 
of availability of a risk free rate for most of the periods considered.  The average daily 
excess return data is presented only for Northern Pacific, Stutz Motor, Piggly Wiggly, 
RCA (successful corners) and silver futures (failed corner), since market data on the pre-
corner period is not available for the other stocks.  In particular we have retrieved the 
residuals from the following regression: ttmti RR εβα ++= ,, , estimated from the pre-
corner period, where Ri is the company/ security i return, and Rm is the market return.12  In 
Table 4 we present t-statistics, based on a regression of the corresponding variable on a 
constant, where we use the Newey-West correction to address autocorrelation-in-residuals 
concerns.  
In the period [t-10, t] there is a significant increase of standardized abnormal 
returns of successful corners, 1.5 standard deviations above the pre-corner period.  The 
increase has a positive sign for failed corners too.  However, it is not statistically 
significant.  After the corner date, strikingly, the successful corner stocks give back all 
abnormal return gains.  Failed corners follow that pattern of post-corner negative returns, 
too, but the drop is less dramatic.  A similar pattern is observed when one uses average 
daily excess returns: average daily excess returns were positive for the [t-10, t] period for 
                                                 
12 For Northern Pacific we use as market return and volume the daily return and volume for the Dow Jones 
Transports/Rails index. For Stutz Motor, Piggly Wiggly, RCA, and the silver futures on COMEX, we have 
used the daily market return and volume of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index.  
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both successful and failed stocks.13  In the period [t+1, t+10] the returns declined for both 
successful and failed corners. 
Before the corner date, there is a significant rise in the abnormal volume of 
successful corner stocks, 0.88 standard deviations above the pre-corner average daily 
volumes.  We observe the same result for failed corner stocks, but by half that magnitude.  
Strikingly, after the corner date we observe a sharp fall in trading volume, especially for 
successful corner stocks.  Price dispersion also increased substantially before the corner 
especially for successful corner stocks, by 8.4%.  A similar increase is observed for failed 
corner stocks, but by much less, 2.9%.  The price dispersion decreased following the 
corner for successful corners (4.8%), but it increased slightly for failed corners (3.3%).  
The above findings are also illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.  In the two figures, there 
is a distinct difference between the patterns followed by successful and failed corner 
stocks.  The successful corner stocks have higher daily price dispersion compared to the 
failed ones, reaching 36.1% on the date of the corner (for failed corners the price 
dispersion is 5.5%) in Figure 3.  The large price dispersion in the case of successful 
corners is indicative of the presence of private information trading and it reflects the 
volatile nature of market corners.  The cumulative excess returns for successful corners 
peaked at the day of the corner to 53% above the pre-corner market return while returns for 
the failed corner are relatively flat at 6% on the corner date in Figure 4.  
In Table 5 we present daily market returns in the period [t-10, t+10] around the 
corner date.  For Harlem, Prairie du Chien, Michigan Southern, Erie, Northwestern, and 
American Gold Coin we use as the market return the return on the equally weighted stocks 
returns, which was hand-collected from the Financial Affairs section of the New York 
Times for the corresponding time period.  At the time, the companies included in that 
section were predominantly railroads.  For Northern Pacific we use the Dow Jones 
Transports/ Rails Index.  For Stutz Motor, Piggly Wiggly, and RCA we use the Dow Jones 
Industrials index.  For the silver corner, we use the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index.  
Daily returns are presented in percentage value.  
Results on market return are mixed.  On average, the days following the corner had 
some of the largest decreases in returns.  This spillover effect of the corner on the market 
return is perhaps due to the fact that short-sellers pressed for liquidity might start a fire sale 
                                                 
13 However, a cautious interpretation of the failed corners is in order, since it is based only on the silver 
futures market corner. 
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of their portfolios thus causing an overall decline of market returns.  The effect seems to be 
transient since the market generally rebounded by the fourth day after the corner.  
Furthermore, we could see a pronounced increase in market volatility in the [t-1, t+1] 
period around the corner date.  This increase is more pronounced for successful corner 
stocks as compared to failed corner stocks.  
The results from Table 5 are further illustrated in Figure 5 where we have presented 
the cumulative market return around the corner date.  As discussed above the impact of 
successful corners on market returns seems to be transient.  However, the impact of failed 
corners on market returns seems to be more pronounced. 
In Table 6 we compute the average daily volatility for the pre-corner period, corner 
sub-period one, and corner sub-period two.  The “open-close” volatility is defined as the 
volatility of ( )tt CloseOpen /ln  prices, i.e. a proxy for the intra-day volatility of returns and 
arrival of new information in the market.  The “close-open” volatility is defined as the 
volatility of ( )tt OpenClose /ln 1− , or the volatility of the between-day returns.  In Panel B 
we present t-tests of the null hypothesis of equality of volatility of various pairs of 
successful corners, (1) through (6).  Opening price quotations are not available for the 
American Gold Coin corner. 
We notice that there was much higher open-close (or intra-day) volatility for 
successful corners, in corner periods one (7.6%) and two (5.5%), as compared to the pre-
corner period (2.5%).  A t-test of equality between pre-corner period and corner period one 
for successful corners’ intra-day volatility reveals that they were statistically significantly 
different (p-value of 0.03).  A similar t-test of equality between the pre-corner period and 
corner period two reveals that the difference was significantly different as well (p-value of 
0.06).  An increase in the open-close volatility in the corner periods is also observed for 
failed stocks, but by a lower magnitude.  Intra-day volatility exceeded between-day 
volatility for successful stocks, in the pre-corner period and corner period one.  This 
supports the hypothesis that intra-day price discovery had higher impact as compared to 
between-day price discovery in the pre-corner period and corner sub-period one.  A t-test 
of equality of the average within-day and between-day volatility in corner period one 
shows that they were statistically significantly different (p-value 0.03).  However, the 
between–day volatility for successful corners for corner period two (10%) exceeded the 
intra-day volatility for the pre-corner period (2%) and for corner period one (2.3%).   
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In Table 7, we present a test of the dynamic return-trading volume relationship in 
the corner period.  We use the theoretical implications of Llorente et al. (2002), running the 
following regression: 
1,,,3,,2,101, ++ ++++= tiititititititi DVRCVRCRCCR ε ,             (1) 
where i indexes the corresponding company/security from our sample, Ri is the 
continuously compounded return based on the closing price, Vi is the natural logarithm of 
the total number of shares traded, and Di is a dummy variable with value 1 in the [t-10, t] 
period around the corner date, t.14  In their formulation, Llorente et al. (2002) ascertain that 
conditional on high trading volume, positive C2 coefficients are evidence of private 
information trading in the market.  To adapt their framework to our analysis we test 
whether the C2 coefficient is increased in the [t-10, t] period.  Thus, we are interested in 
testing whether the coefficient (C3) of the interaction term, DVR titi ,, , has a positive sign.  If 
indeed private information trading was prevalent in the first corner period, then we would 
expect that the C3 coefficient would be positive and significant.15  We explore the analysis 
of our hypothesis for each of the twelve corner stocks and one corner commodity (silver 
futures contracts).  We find statistically weak evidence of informed trading in the period [t-
10, t]: twelve of the thirteen C3 coefficients are positive; however only four of them are 
significant.  Informed trading around corner dates appears stronger for successful corners 
(higher average C3 and R2).  In unreported results we find that these conclusions are robust 
to different period lengths, [t-5, t], and [t-20, t].  The results from Table 7 are also 
consistent with the autocorrelation results presented in Table 2. 
We are mindful of the limitations of the above test of private information trading: 
even though individual C3 coefficients are for the most part positive, they are generally 
insignificant.  Perhaps this is due to the small sample we use in individual regressions as 
can be seen in Table 7.  To mitigate this constraint, we estimate a pooled regression, where 
                                                 
14 In their work, Llorente et al. (2002) use a measure of turnover, defined as the logarithm of the total number 
of shares traded scaled by the total number of shares outstanding. They further detrend this variable with a 
200-days moving average. Given the data source limitations we faced, we could not replicate their proxy for 
trading volume – the total number of shares outstanding is not available for the stocks in our sample, and the 
data is available only for 60-100 days around the market corner. We note though that our proxy – logarithm 
of the total number of shares traded has the same time-series behavior if we assume that there is no change in 
the total number of shares outstanding within the corner period. Moreover, Llorente et al. (2002) show that 
the empirical implications of their theoretical result hold for total trading volume. Thus we use the logarithm 
of total trading volume. 
15 Here, price manipulation can be viewed as a special case of private information trading in which the 
manipulator controls a large float of shares and determines the timing of the corner.  
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we have restricted only the coefficient C3 to be the same for all stocks/commodities while 
allowing the other coefficients to vary (introducing fixed effects for C0, C1, and C2), an 
approach which allows us to test whether the imposed constraint on C3  is a true one. 
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The estimates of C3 from the pooled regression are reported in Table 7.  Both 
successful and failed corners exhibit positive, statistically significant C3 coefficients.  
When we pool all stocks/ commodities and perform the regression, the result is again a 
positive and highly statistically significant C3 coefficient of 0.04 with a t-statistic of 4.11.  
We interpret this as supporting our hypothesis of private information trading prior to the 
market corner.  The presence of private information trading is consistent with the 
conjecture that the manipulator has more information on his holdings as well as his 
intended corner date.  
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigates price and trading volume patterns around some well known 
stock market corners in US history.  The analyses are based on a hand-collected new 
dataset of price and trading volume reported in the New York Times and Wall Street 
Journal from 1863-1928.  We present strong evidence that large investors and corporate 
insiders possess market power that allows them to manipulate market price.  Our results 
show that market corners as a result of manipulation tend to increase market volatility and 
could have an adverse price impact on other assets.  We demonstrate that the presence of 
large investors makes it extremely risky for short sellers to arbitrage mispricing in the 
stock market.  This creates severe limits to arbitrage in the stock market that tends to 
impede market efficiency.  It can create a situation when there can be overpricing but 
arbitrageurs are unwilling to establish a short position because of manipulation risk (in 
addition to fundamental and noise trader risk).  Therefore, regulators and exchanges need 
to be concerned about ensuring that corners do not take place since they are accompanied 
by severe price distortions.    
An important question for future research is how corners occur in a rational 
expectations setting.  The historical evidence shows that corners occurred repeatedly until 
they were outlawed. This suggests that they were profitable for those causing them and that 
those undertaking short sales lost money when a corner occurred.   Why would the short 
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sellers be willing to bear the risks of such a loss?  Presumably the reason is that the rest of 
the time when the market is not cornered they make sufficient profits from their short sales 
to at least make up for the corners.  This will only happen if the market is fairly inefficient 
in the sense that arbitrage does not lead prices to fully reflect fundamentals.  Interestingly 
the possibility of corners can increase the price of stocks before the corner attempt.  Those 
who actually hold the stock when the corner takes place are able to sell at a high price and 
this will be reflected beforehand.  If corners involve sufficient risk, however, then the price 
effect may be negative relative to an equilibrium with no corners. 
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Table 1: The Sample of Corners 
We define the corner date as the date when shares that were sold short are called by the manipulator. Corner dates 
have been established as found in the references, in particular, Clews (1888), Flynn (1934), Thomas (1989), and 
Wycoff (1968, 1972). Alongside the corner date we have characterized the outcome of the corner as successful or 
failed. For the Stutz Motor Company and the Piggly-Wiggly Company, we do not have observations after the 
corner date, due to the institutional halt in trading for both stocks, shortly prior to the corner date. Instead, for 
these stocks we report the results only for the period until the end of trading. 
 
Company Name Corner Date Corner Status 
Harlem   
1863 08/24/1863 Successful 
1864 05/17/1864 Successful 
Prairie du Chien 11/07/1865 Successful 
Michigan Southern 04/04/1866 Successful 
Erie Railroads   
March – 1868 03/10/1868 Failed 
October – 1868 11/16/1868 Successful 
American Gold Coin 09/24/1869 Failed 
Erie Railroads, 1872 09/17/1872 Failed 
Northwestern 11/23/1872 Successful 
Northern Pacific 05/09/1901 Successful 
Stutz Motor 04/26/1920 Successful 
Piggly Wiggly 03/20/1923 Successful 
RCA 03/13/1928 Successful 
Silver “Corner”, 1980 01/21/1980 Failed 
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Table 2: The Return, Price Dispersion, and Volume around Corners 
The corner period is defined as [t-10, t+10] days around the corner date, t, a total of twenty-one days, including the corner date.
The number of observations reflects the number of non-missing daily return observations.  Return is defined as the continuously 
compounded return computed from the close price. Share volume is defined as the total number of shares traded in the 
corresponding trading day. Autocorrelation refers to the autocorrelation of returns computed within the corresponding period
(differs across panels A, B, and C), ( )1ttt R,Rcorr −=ρ . Price dispersion refers to the difference between high and low, scaled 
with the close price for each trading day. For Stutz Motor, we have defined the corner period starting date as 10 days prior to
the decision to halt the trading of the company stock, since its corner date is after the official halt of trading. The pre-corner 
period is defined as the period since data is available through eleven days before the corner date. The first corner sub-period is 
defined as the period ten days before the corner date until the corner date. The second corner sub-period is defined as the period 
from the first day following the corner to the tenth day following the corner date.              
 
Panel A: Pre-corner Period 
 Daily Return  Daily Price Dispersion Daily Shares Traded Daily 
Autocorr. 
 N Mean Std. Dev  Mean (%) Std. Dev 
(%) 
Mean Std. Dev  ρ1,cs 
Harlem, 1863 58 0.003 0.058 4.0 3.6 10,415 7,656 -0.206 
Harlem, 1864 53 0.010 0.054 5.0 3.9 10,536 8,171 -0.173 
Prairie du Chien 34 0.006 0.027 2.4 1.8 1,471 1,372 0.326 
Michigan Southern 41 0.004 0.019 2.6 1.7 12,070 4,966 -0.430 
Erie, 03-1868 39 -0.002 0.016 1.8 1.3 19,791 8,748 0.022 
Erie, 11-1868 55 -0.002 0.028 2.8 1.5 7,602 7,571 0.200 
Gold Coin, 1869 48 0.000 0.005 - - - - 0.140 
Erie, 1872 43 -0.002 0.026 3.0 1.9 19,647 13,609 -0.144 
Northwestern 40 0.001 0.029 2.9 2.4 20,283 18,209 -0.175 
Northern Pacific 56 0.005 0.013 1.9 1.2 37,645 33,841 -0.059 
Stutz Motor 56 0.011 0.039 3.1 3.0 1,009 971 0.087 
Piggly Wiggly 61 0.006 0.034 2.2 1.8 2,405 2,385 -0.232 
RCA 46 0.001 0.023 3.2 1.5 79,734 48,919 -0.036 
Silver “Corner”, 1980 40 0.018 0.035 2.3 2.2 7,125 5,069 0.542 
Mean  0.004 0.029 2.9 2.1   -0.010 
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Table 2. (continued) 
Panel B: Corner- Period One, [t –10, t] 
 Daily Return  Daily Price Dispersion Daily Shares Traded Daily Autocorr. 
 Mean Std. Dev  Mean 
(%) 
Std. Dev 
(%)  
Mean Std. Dev  ρ1,cs 
Harlem, 1863 0.019 0.039 3.2 1.7 8,459 3,902 0.131 
Harlem, 1864 0.018 0.029 1.0 1.4 773 641 -0.194 
Prairie du Chien 0.035 0.109 16.7 14.7 4,287 1,698 0.167 
Michigan Southern 0.011 0.014 5.1 3.6 14,491 7,693 0.264 
Erie, 03-1868 0.009 0.029 4.2 2.3 24,462 13,966 0.026 
Erie, 11-1868 0.021 0.077 5.1 2.8 14,402 17,708 0.713 
Gold Coin, 1869 -0.002 0.024 - - - - -0.285 
Erie, 1872 0.006 0.023 4.4 3.1 23,600 13,665 -0.298 
Northwestern 0.093 0.161 11.4 18.3 7,536 5,385 0.525 
Northern Pacific 0.122 0.246 24.9 49.2 119,263 112,599 0.122 
Stutz Motor 0.066 0.048 7.3 2.7 3,585 1,879 -0.243 
Piggly Wiggly 0.005 0.066 8.7 17.0 3,982 6,357 -0.119 
RCA 0.036 0.050 4.8 3.4 182,664 119,044 0.803 
Silver “Corner”, 1980 0.023 0.012 0.0 0.0 9,347 5,129 -0.059 
Mean 0.033 0.066 7.5 9.2   0.111 
 
Panel C: Corner-Period Two, [t+1, t+10] 
 Daily Return  Daily Price Dispersion Daily Shares Traded Daily Autocorr. 
 Mean Std. Dev  Mean 
(%) 
Std. Dev 
(%)  
Mean Std. Dev  ρ1,cs 
Harlem, 1863 -0.032 0.035 4.8 5.0 6,681 2,819 0.672 
Harlem, 1864 0.000 0.007 0.3 0.4 375 199 -0.412 
Prairie du Chien -0.026 0.110 2.9 4.8 620 444 -0.356 
Michigan Southern -0.011 0.019 3.5 7.1 6,600 4,787 0.062 
Erie, 03-1868 -0.004 0.028 3.0 1.6 16,003 8,017 0.394 
Erie, 11-1868 -0.035 0.019 11.9 11.8 7,398 7,843 -0.223 
Gold Coin, 1869 -0.002 0.007 - - - - -0.086 
Erie, 1872 -0.006 0.031 6.1 3.6 20,236 14,063 -0.064 
Northwestern -0.121 0.186 5.2 10.7 2,335 2,146 0.620 
Northern Pacific -0.099 0.258 3.2 2.6 980 646 -0.958 
Stutz Motor - - - - - - -  
Piggly Wiggly - - - - - - -  
RCA 0.009 0.047 6.9 3.0 99,690 71,470 -0.026 
Silver “Corner”, 1980 -0.019 0.014 0.7 1.1 5,097 4,036 -0.309 
Mean -0.029 0.063 4.0 4.3   -0.057 
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Table 3: Abnormal Standardized Returns for Corner Stocks  
Abnormal standardized return is defined as the daily return in the corner period in excess of the average daily return in the pre-corner period, standardized with the 
standard deviation of the pre-corner daily return, shown in Table 2. Day zero (i.e. t) is the day of the corner. If we could not find data from the New York Times and 
Wall Street Journal for the corresponding day (due to unreadable records or missing issues of the source), we do not report the daily return figure. For Stutz Motor, 
day zero is defined as the day when the NYSE halted trading in that stock. For the Stutz Motor and Piggly Wiggly corners, trading was halted prior or upon the corner 
occurrence.  
 
           Day t           
 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Successful  Corners                      
Harlem, 1863 0.18 -0.08 0.12 1.15 1.15 -1.14 -0.49 0.28 1.10 0.35 0.34 -0.54 -0.25 -0.34 -0.17 0.18 -0.28 -0.35 -0.87 -1.90 -1.52 
Harlem, 1864 -0.22 -0.84 0.64 0.21 -0.18 1.40 0.17 0.44 0.15 0.15 -0.18 -0.18 -0.45 0.08 -0.12 -0.18 -0.18 -0.25 -0.12 -0.25 -0.12 
Prairie du Chien -0.20 - - 2.36 -0.57 3.81 3.21 6.15 - - -7.24 1.84 -7.90 -5.45 5.05 - - - -1.66 0.17 -0.20 
Michigan Southern 0.12 -0.62 -0.21 0.94 -0.37 0.36 - - 1.94 0.95 0.17 -2.53 -2.97 0.29 -0.87 -0.54 0.21 -0.38 -0.29 -0.63 -0.38 
Erie, 11-1868 -1.15 0.19 0.42 -0.14 -0.26 -0.03 -0.38 -1.10 -1.14 4.50 8.17 -1.62 -1.41 -1.18 -1.54 -0.76 0.40 -1.53 -1.84 - - 
Northwestern 0.79 -0.32 -0.17 -0.12 0.19 0.08 -0.22 4.27 1.73 17.03 11.29 -4.78 -12.16 -16.90 - - 0.08 1.06 -0.41 -0.26 0.33 
Northern Pacific - - 2.78 -0.03 -0.83 -4.00 0.16 10.61 - - 52.25 -57.74 - - -5.14 -6.00 0.18 3.77 3.08 -0.59 0.60 
Stutz Motor 1.53 1.64 0.30 1.89 0.04 2.98 3.25 -0.74 0.59 2.70 1.13 - - - - - - - - - - 
Piggly Wiggly -0.33 -0.24 -0.33 0.66 -1.04 -0.43 -0.34 -4.70 1.88 0.64 3.65 - - - - - - - - - - 
RCA 0.66 0.31 -0.31 -0.37 0.99 0.86 -0.53 0.30 3.97 4.82 6.01 2.26 1.14 -2.10 -0.18 -0.49 -1.28 5.32 -1.16 -0.03 -0.03 
Mean 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.7 -0.1 0.4 0.5 1.7 1.3 3.9 7.6 -7.9 -3.4 -3.7 -0.4 -1.3 -0.1 1.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 
St. Dev. 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.7 2.2 1.5 4.6 1.5 5.6 16.5 20.3 4.8 6.2 3.0 2.3 0.6 2.5 1.5 0.7 0.7 
           Day t           
 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Failed Corners                      
Erie, 03-1868 0.48 -0.10 -0.45 -0.70 4.74 2.21 -0.41 2.16 2.30 -2.25 -0.40 0.77 1.28 -1.01 -2.89 -2.23 -1.85 2.34 2.38 -0.53 0.47 
Gold, 1869 0.53 0.01 0.36 0.18 0.35 0.18 0.87 0.35 4.77 2.84 -13.90 -0.71 -1.43 -0.71 1.45 -3.43 0.92 0.37 -0.36 0.01 -0.36 
Erie, 1872 0.57 0.17 -0.22 -0.52 0.87 -1.12 0.38 1.07 1.89 -0.87 1.02 0.90 -0.11 -1.04 -0.02 2.37 -2.13 -1.18 -0.82 0.17 0.17 
Silver “Corner”, 1980 0.37 -0.94 0.13 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.18 -1.25 -1.27 -1.29 -1.31 -1.33 -0.21 -0.97 -1.56 -0.41 -1.38 
Mean 0.5 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 1.6 0.4 0.3 1.0 2.3 0.0 -3.3 -0.1 -0.4 -1.0 -0.7 -1.2 -0.8 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 
St. Dev. 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.5 2.1 1.4 0.5 0.9 1.9 2.2 7.1 1.1 1.3 0.2 1.8 2.5 1.4 1.6 1.7 0.3 0.8 
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Table 4: Successful vs. Failed Corner Stocks Using Standardized Abnormal Returns, Volumes, Price Dispersion, and Excess Returns 
and Volumes 
Standardized abnormal return is defined as the daily return in the corner period in excess of the average daily return in the pre-corner period, divided by the 
standard deviation of the pre-corner daily return, shown in Table 2. We define similarly the standardized abnormal share volume. Price dispersion is the
daily spread between high and low as a percentage from the close price for the corner stocks. The daily excess return and volume are defined as the residual
of the Black version of the CAPM model within the corner period, where the CAPM coefficients have been estimated from the pre-corner period. The 
average daily excess return data is presented only for Northern Pacific, Stutz Motor, Piggly Wiggly, RCA (successful corners) and silver “corner” (failed
corner), since market data on the pre-corner period is not available for the other stocks. In parentheses below the averages we present their t-statistics, based 
on a regression of the corresponding variable on a constant, where we have used the Newey-West correction for autocorrelation in residuals. Day zero (i.e. t) 
is the day of the corner.  
 
 Corner Period 1, 
[t–10, t] 
Corner Period 2, 
[t+1, t+10] 
 Successful Failed Successful Failed 
Average Daily Standardized Abnormal Return 1.51 0.20 -1.76 -0.45 
T-stat (2.27) (0.67) (-1.91) (-2.28) 
     
Average Daily Standardized Abnormal Volume 0.88 0.42 -0.64 -0.26 
T-stat (2.76) (1.80) (-4.31) (-1.20) 
     
Average Daily Price Dispersion (%) 8.4 % 2.9 % 4.8 % 3.3 % 
T-stat (4.05) (3.57) (4.56) (3.43) 
     
Average Daily Excess Return  0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 
T-stat (2.04) (2.15) (-0.86) (-11.48) 
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Table 5: Market Daily Return around Corner Dates 
We present the daily market returns in the period [t-10, t+10] of the corner date. For Harlem, Prairie du Chien, Michigan Southern, Erie, Northwestern, and American Gold Coin we 
use as market return the return on the equally weighted stocks returns hand collected from the Financial Affairs section of the New York Times, for the corresponding period. At the 
time, the companies included in that section were predominantly railroads. For Northern Pacific we use the Dow Jones Transports/ Rails Index. For Stutz Motor, Piggly Wiggly, and 
RCA we use the Dow Jones Industrials index. For the silver corner, we use the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index. Daily returns are presented in percentage value. 
 
Day t  
 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Successful Corners % 
Harlem, 1863 -0.8 0.4 2.6 1.9 2.1 -0.3 -0.1 1.3 -0.2 0.0 1.8 0.2 -1.2 -0.3 0.0 0.9 -0.3 -1.0 -2.5 -6.2 0.9 
Harlem, 1864 -2.0 -2.0 2.0 -0.1 2.3 1.3 1.2 -0.7 1.3 3.1 0.1 1.9 -2.4 0.1 1.8 -0.9 0.5 0.5 -0.5 -0.7 -0.1 
Prairie du Chien, 1865 0.7 -0.1 0.7 1.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.5 0.5 -0.7 2.5 0.0 -1.4 0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.9 
Michigan Southern, 1866 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 0.4 0.1 0.6 -0.8 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.6 2.6 -1.3 0.5 
Erie, 11-1868 -2.4 -3.0 -2.5 3.5 0.0 -0.8 0.2 -0.8 -0.5 3.5 0.7 -1.6 1.3 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5 1.4 -0.7 0.6 1.3 0.0 
Northwestern, 1872 2.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 0.7 -0.3 -0.4 1.4 0.8 3.3 0.9 0.9 -5.1 0.7 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.5 -0.8 
Northern Pacific, 1901 0.7 1.7 0.6 1.3 -0.1 -1.3 0.3 0.9 -0.5 -4.8 -7.7 6.3 -0.4 -4.8 2.1 1.0 2.2 -0.1 -1.2 0.7 -0.2 
Stutz Motor, 1920 0.5 -0.7 0.3 -0.3 -2.5 -2.4 -3.6 1.3 -1.8 0.3 1.5 -0.8 -1.7 -1.7 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.8 1.4 
Piggly Wiggly, 1923 -0.5 -0.2 -0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 -0.5 -0.8 0.9 0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -1.1 -0.7 -0.9 0.7 0.4 -0.7 0.0 -1.2 
RCA, 1928 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.5 1.2 0.9 -1.0 0.4 1.5 -0.5 1.5 -0.5 -0.6 0.9 0.9 -0.3 -0.2 0.8 0.8 -0.1 0.9 
Mean -0.1 -0.4 0.2 0.8 0.5 -0.3 -0.5 0.3 0.1 0.8 -0.1 0.4 -0.9 -0.7 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 0.2 
St. Dev. 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.0 2.5 2.8 2.3 1.8 1.6 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.3 2.1 0.8 
 Day t  
 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Failed Corners % 
Erie, 03-1868 0.7 0.5 -0.2 -0.9 1.0 0.5 -0.1 0.1 2.9 -0.2 -4.1 -0.3 0.4 0.2 -0.5 -1.5 -0.1 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 
Gold, 1869 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -1.4 0.7 0.3 -0.8 -2.5 0.3 0.4 -1.0 -3.8 -4.5 1.7 1.2 2.2 0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
Erie, 1872 -0.5 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.4 -0.6 0.0 0.5 0.5 -0.3 -1.7 0.2 0.1 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.8 -0.2 
Silver “Corner”, 1980 0.4 2.1 0.1 1.0 -0.1 0.6 0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.4 0.6 -0.8 1.3 0.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.5 0.9 -0.7 0.6 -0.7 
Mean 0.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -1.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.9 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.3 -0.2 
St. Dev. 0.5 1.0 0.2 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.6 2.3 0.4 2.2 0.5 2.3 2.4 1.0 1.1 1.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.3 
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Table 6: Average Daily Volatility for Corner Stocks 
We compute the average daily volatility for the pre-corner period, corner period 1, and corner period 2. The “open-close” volatility is 
defined as the volatility of ( )tt Close/Openln . The “close-open” volatility is defined as the volatility of ( )1tt Close/Openln − . In panel B 
we present t-tests of the null hypothesis of equality of means of groups of successful corners (1) through (6). Opening price quotations 
are not available for the American Gold Coin corner.  
 
 
Panel A:  
 
Pre-Corner Period 
 
Corner Period 1,  
[t–10, t] 
Corner Period 2, 
[t+1, t+10] 
 Open-Close Close-Open Open-Close Close-Open Open-Close Close-Open 
 Within-day Between-day Within-day Between-day Within-day Between-day 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Successful Corners       
Harlem, 1863 0.043 0.032 0.025 0.018 0.034 0.018 
Harlem, 1864 0.037 0.036 0.016 0.019 0.005 0.006 
Prairie du Chien 0.020 0.021 0.140 0.011 0.147 0.177 
Michigan Southern 0.012 0.010 0.019 0.016 0.039 0.030 
Erie, 11-1868 0.016 0.023 0.030 0.067 0.047 0.049 
Northwestern 0.028 0.024 0.174 0.018 0.096 0.206 
Northern Pacific 0.014 0.005 0.204 0.029 0.025 0.262 
Stutz Motor 0.032 0.020 0.048 0.021 - - 
Piggly Wiggly 0.026 0.019 0.058 0.016 - - 
RCA 0.021 0.009 0.042 0.018 0.044 0.055 
Mean 0.025 0.020 0.076 0.023 0.055 0.100 
       
Failed Corners       
Erie, 03-1868 0.010 0.012 0.031 0.019 0.020 0.012 
Gold Coin, 1869 - - - - - - 
Erie, 1872 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.010 0.031 0.011 
Silver “Corner”, 1980 0.017 0.033 0.000 0.012 0.010 0.013 
Mean 0.015 0.021 0.016 0.014 0.021 0.012 
 
Panel B: T-tests of equality of means between groups of successful corners 
 P-value      
 (1) vs. (2) 0.29      
 (1) vs. (3) 0.03      
 (1) vs. (5) 0.06      
 (2) vs. (4) 0.57      
 (2) vs. (6) 0.02      
 (3) vs. (4) 0.03      
 (5) vs. (6) 0.25      
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Table 7: Test of Dynamic Return-Trading Volume Relationship (Llorente et al. (2002)) 
We present the results of the regression 1t,iit,it,i3t,it,i2t,i101t,i DVRCVRCRCCR ++ ε++++= , where i indexes the corresponding cornered security from our sample, Ri is 
the continuously compounded return based on the close price, Vi is the natural logarithm of the total number of shares traded, and Di is a dummy variable with value 1 in the 
[t-10, t] period around the corner date. We also report coefficients from the pooled regression, where we have restricted coefficient C3 to be the same for all stocks/ securities 
while allowing the other coefficients to vary (fixed effects for C0, C1, and C2), 1t,iit,it,i3
15
1i
t,it,i2,i
15
1i
t,i1,i
15
1i
0,i1t,i DVRCVRCRCCR +
===
+ ε++++= ∑∑∑ . Single asterisk (*) indicates 
10% level significance while (**) indicates 5% level significance. 
 
Company Obs. C0 C1 C2 C3 t-stat (C0) t-stat (C1) t-stat (C2) t-stat (C3) R2 (%) 
Successful Corners           
Harlem, 1863 75 0.00 -0.28 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.19 0.11 0.90 2.0 
Harlem, 1864 82 0.01 -1.31 0.13 0.07 1.83 -2.67 2.31 1.09 10.1 
Prairie du Chien 39 0.00 -0.20 0.02 0.11* -0.08 -0.23 0.13 1.79 12.6 
Michigan Southern 70 0.00 1.81 -0.21 0.05 0.54 0.65 -0.71 1.13 4.3 
Erie, 11-1868 77 0.00 0.71 -0.07 0.13** -0.74 0.68 -0.66 4.46 27.3 
Northwestern 64 0.00 5.50 -0.55 0.02 -0.06 1.79 -1.60 0.72 34.5 
Northern Pacific 66 0.02 3.25 -0.46 0.19** 2.92 2.94 -3.88 3.00 82.4 
Stutz Motor 57 0.02 -1.43 0.20 0.01 2.64 -1.42 1.48 0.41 13.7 
Piggly Wiggly 68 0.01 2.37 -0.32 0.02 1.78 1.69 -1.84 0.53 8.3 
RCA 79 0.00 -2.40 0.19 0.08** 0.93 -1.11 1.08 3.71 25.4 
Mean 68 0.01 0.80 -0.10 0.07     22.1 
Pooled Regression  
(successful corners) 677    0.04**    4.18 37.7 
Failed Corners           
Erie, 03-1868 74 0.00 1.61 -0.15 0.00 -0.35 0.63 -0.58 0.12 1.9 
Gold, 1869 - - - - - - - - - - 
Erie, 1872 79 0.00 0.88 -0.09 -0.02 -0.17 0.46 -0.52 -0.47 2.1 
Silver “Corner”, 1980 132 0.00 1.97 -0.20 0.08 -0.42 1.42 -1.36 0.83 2.8 
Mean 95 0.00 1.49 -0.15 0.02     2.2 
Pooled Regression  
(failed corners) 285    0.02    0.60 2.4 
Overall Pooled Regression  962    0.04**    4.11 29.4 
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Figure 1. Cumulative Abnormal Trading Volume (Standardized) 
Abnormal trading volume is defined as the difference between daily volume in the corner period and the pre-corner 
period average daily trading volume. We standardize this variable with the standard deviation of the pre-corner period 
daily volume. In the figure, we have accumulated the trading volume across the corner period, i.e. at date t–10 we have 
plotted the abnormal trading volume at that day, at date t–9 we have plotted the sum of the variable values at dates t–
10 and t–9, etc. 
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Figure 2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Standardized) 
Abnormal standardized returns are defined as the daily return in the corner period in excess of the average daily return 
in the pre-corner period, standardized by the standard deviation of the pre-corner daily return.  Thus the vertical axis is 
to be read as standard deviation units around the pre-corner mean. In the figure, we have accumulated the standardized
abnormal return over the course of the corner period, i.e. at date t–10 we have plotted the abnormal standardized daily 
return at that day, at date t–9 we have plotted the sum of the variable values at dates t–10 and t–9, etc. 
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Figure 3. Daily Price Dispersion (High-Low) as a Percentage of Closing Prices 
Daily price dispersion is the difference between the high and low prices within a given trading day as a percentage of 
the close price. 
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Figure 4. Cumulative Excess Returns (5 corners only) 
We exhibit the cumulative excess return for five corners: Northern Pacific, Stutz Motor, Piggly Wiggly, RCA, and the
Silver futures. Our sample is limited to these stocks since market return data is available only for them for the whole 
sample period. Of these the only failed corner is the one for silver futures. Excess return is defined as the residual of
the regression: tt,mt,i RR ε+β+α= , estimated for the pre-corner period, where Ri is the company i return, and Rm is 
the market return. For Northern Pacific we use as market return the daily return for Dow Jones Transports/Rails index.
For Stutz Motor, Piggly Wiggly, RCA, and the silver futures on COMEX, we have used as daily market return on the
Dow Jones Industrial Average index. 
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Figure 5. Cumulative Market Return around Corner Date (5 corners only) 
We exhibit the cumulative market return for five corners: Northern Pacific, Stutz Motor, Piggly Wiggly, RCA, and the
Silver futures. In the figure, we have accumulated the market return across the corner period, i.e. at date t–10 we have 
plotted the market return at that day, at date t–9 we have plotted the sum of the market returns at dates t–10 and t–9, 
etc. 
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Appendix A: Famous Market Corners In America’s Financial History 
 
I. The First Harlem Corner16 (1863) 
Allen and Gale (1992) describe the 1863 Harlem corner: “At the beginning of 1863, Commodore 
Cornelius Vanderbuilt bought stock in the Harlem Railway at around $8 to $9 a share. He took an interest 
in running the company and its stock price advanced to $50 per share. In April, 1863, the New York City 
Council passed an ordinance allowing the Harlem Railway to build a streetcar system the length of 
Broadway and, as a result, the stock price went to $75. Members of the council (and Daniel Drew, a 
director of the company) then conspired to sell the stock short, repeal the ordinance, and thus force the 
price down. However, Vanderbuilt discovered the plot and managed to buy the entire stock of the 
company in secret. When the members of the council tried to cover their short positions after the repeal of 
the ordinance, they discovered that none of the stock could be purchased. Vanderbuilt forced them to 
settle at $179 per share.” 
 
II. The Second Harlem Corner17 (1864) 
After the betrayal by the New York City Council, Vanderbilt decided to go to Albany to get his 
Harlem Railway extension directly from the New York State Legislature.  Hoping for revenge, Drew 
conspired with the unwary state legislators to spread news about the likely passing of the legislation, push 
up the price, then proceed to sell the stock short, defeat the bill, and force the price down.  The stock price 
dropped from $150 to $100 in two days. Vanderbilt was furious and bought more shares than were 
actually in existence. He forced the short sellers to settle at $285 and Drew again lost over half a million 
dollars.  
 
III. The Prairie du Chien Corner18 (1865)  
On Nov. 6th, 1865, a bull pool led by William Marston, a well known stock market operator at the 
time was reported by the New York Times as having gained control of the entire outstanding 29,880 shares 
of Prairie du Chien Railroad Company as well as a similar amount of short interests.  The pool called for a 
settlement that morning, which led to “…one of the sharpest and beyond all precedent the most sudden 
corner known to the forty years’ history of the New-York Stock Exchange.” 
                                                 
16 Chancellor (2000), chapter 6 and Allen and Gale (1992). 
17 Clews (1888), chapter 34. 
18 See New York Times, 11/07/1865, Financial Affairs section. 
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IV. The Michigan Southern Corner19 (1866) 
No details were found. 
 
V.  The Failed Erie Corner20 (March 1868) 
  In 1868, Vanderbilt set out to wrestle control of the Erie Railroad from Daniel Drew and Jay 
Gould. He was confident due to his victories in the Harlem battles and he had as his allies a group of 
Boston capitalists who had a large block of Erie stocks.  So he proceeded to buy control of the company 
while Drew and Gould were selling.  He poured millions into the purchase of the stock and had apparently 
bought more stocks than were in existence.  So it looked as if the short sellers were cornered.  However, 
Drew was well prepared this time.  As a director of the company, he surprised Vanderbilt by converting a 
large hidden issue of convertible bonds into common stocks and flooded the market with these new 
shares.  Vanderbilt’s corner was broken after he had sunk in seven million dollars for Erie stock.  
 
VI. The Erie Corner21 (November 1868)  
In late 1868, Drew and Gould were involved in a bear raid on the market by selling Erie and other 
stocks short.  Then they tried to force the interest rates up and a general market decline by a large 
withdrawal of funds from New York banks.  Agitated by Drew’s wavering during the operation, Gould 
suddenly switched his strategy from bear raid to bull run.  Unaware of Gould’s switch, Drew kept on 
selling Erie short.  The price dropped from $50 to $40 in October and went further down to $35 on 
November 13. But Gould by then had bought all the floating shares of Erie.  On November 16, the price 
suddenly jumped to $55 and Drew was cornered with 70,000 shares short.     
                                                 
19 Chancellor (2000), chapter 6. 
20 Chancellor (2000), chapter 6. 
21 Sharp, R. (1989). 
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VII. The Failed Gold Coin Corner22 (1869) 
In 1868, the whole floating supply of gold was about $20 million and the government held about 
$75 million in reserve.  Jay Gould thought that this whole supply could be cornered and thus selling it at 
an inflated price.  He conspired with Abel Corbin, the brother-in-law of President Grant, to influence 
government policy on gold.  On numerous occasions, he lobbied Grant and government officials on the 
benefits of high gold prices.  For a moment, it appeared that Grant was quite convinced.  Gould proceeded 
to accumulate a $50 million position in gold and the price had risen from 130 to 137.  To increase his 
chance of success, Gould then launched an aggressive lobbying of government officials who began to 
suspect his speculative motives.  Sensing the government might intervene to break his corner, he secretly 
sold his position while urging his friends to buy at any price.  On October 4, the feverish purchase by 
Gould’s friends had pushed the gold price from 140 to 160, but government selling later during the day 
quickly broke the squeeze and brought the price back to $140.  This day had gone down in history as 
another Black Friday, since hundreds of firms on Wall Street were ruined by the huge price swing.   
 
VIII. The Failed Erie Corner23 (1872) 
In the summer of 1872, Jay Gould asked Daniel Drew and Henry Smith to join him for a bear raid 
on Erie stocks.  They conspired to depress the stocks by suddenly withdrawing large sums of money from 
New York banks, which created a small liquidity crisis due to the lack of lenders of last resort at the time. 
But Drew turned bullish after their initial success.  So he reversed his trades and proceeded to build a 
large position without notifying Gould and Smith.  On September 17, he cornered the market by calling 
for a settlement.  But Gould was able to deliver the stocks.  However, the corner had a large impact on the 
prices of all stocks. 
 
IX. The Northwestern Corner24 (1872) 
In November 1872, Jay Gould tricked Daniel Drew and Henry Smith into joining him for another 
bear raid by selling Northwestern stock short.  Not suspecting Gould’s intention, they kept selling the 
stock short while Gould at the same time was building a huge position.  The rising price made Smith 
suspicious and he got a warrant for Gould’s arrest on charges of looting the Erie treasury.  Gould wriggled 
out of the charges and decided to ruin Drew and Smith by cornering the market on Northwestern.  The 
                                                 
22 Chancellor (2000), chapter 6. 
23 Chancellor (2000), chapter 6. 
24 Chancellor (2000), chapter 6. 
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price soared from $80 to $230 in a few days and they were asked to settle at that price. The corner had a 
serious impact on the prices of all stocks.25 
 
X. The Northern Pacific Corner26 (1901) 
In spring 1901, J.P. Morgan and a group of investors led by Edward Harriman fought for the 
control of Northern Pacific Railroad, which could lead to gaining control of railroad traffic to the Pacific 
coast.  Harriman started by acquiring $40 million from the common stock, running just short of 40,000 
shares of gaining control.  Alarmed by the scheme, J.P. Morgan went out to acquire the rest of stocks and 
his purchase sent prices soaring from $114 to $147 in 5 days.  Noticing the unusual increase in the price, a 
group of short sellers built a large short interest volume in the stock.  On May 9th short sellers realized that 
they were caught in an unintended corner, and the price went from $170 to a record level of $1000 during 
the day.  The market for other stocks plummeted since short sellers were pressed to cover their positions 
by selling their other assets.27  The volume traded was 3,336,000 for the day, a record not broken until 
1925.  Morgan and Harriman agreed to settle with the short sellers at $150 the next day.  
 
XI. The Stutz Motor Company of America, Inc. Corner28 (1920) 
Allan Ryan, known in the early twentieth century as a speculator good at the art of squeezing short 
sellers, had bought a controlling interest in the Stutz Motor Company of America, Inc.  At the beginning 
of 1920, its price had risen steadily from $100 to $134.  Ryan was told that short sellers had taken action 
thinking that the price had risen too high.  Among this bear raid were some prominent members of the 
stock exchange.  To counter the bears, Ryan borrowed substantial amounts to buy additional shares.  At 
first, despite Ryan’s heavy purchase, the price went down, since the short-selling pressure was 
considerable.  But then the price shot up late March, reaching $391.  Towards the end of March, the stock 
the short sellers were selling had to be borrowed from Ryan, since he had almost all floating shares.  On 
March 31st, the Governing Committee of NYSE announced that it had decided to suspend all dealings in 
Stutz Motor stock for an indefinite period due to irregular price gyrations.  On April 20th, the Protective 
committee of NYSE announced that it was ready to accept impartial mediation on a negotiated-settlement 
price that led to a settlement at the price of $550.  Shortly after this fiasco, the NYSE quietly amended its 
                                                 
25 See New York Times, November 26th, 1872 and also Chancellor (2000), page 171. 
26 Thomas (1989). 
27 Kyle and Xiong (2001) develop a model that captures the contagion effect. 
28 Brooks (1969). 
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constitution by allowing the governing committee to postpone the time for deliveries on contracts for the 
purpose of preventing market corners.   
 
XII. The Piggly-Wiggly Corner29 (1923) 
Piggly-Wiggly was a grocery chain in the Midwest.  Clarence Saunders, the president of Piggly-
Wiggly, wished to make a seasoned equity offering.  To raise the price of the stock, he hired a well known 
stock manipulator, Jesse Livermore, to push up the stock price.  The rising price attracted substantial short 
interest, which eventually led to a market squeeze in mid-March.  Given his large position, Clarence 
Saunders thought that he could make more money by canceling his previous plan to issue more stocks and 
thus make the bears pay even more.  On March 23, price soared 50 points in a single day.  However, the 
governors of the Big Board decided to delist Piggly-Wiggly the next day, and let the bears buy the stock 
at a nominal price.  
 
XIII. The Radio Corporation of America Corner30 (1928) 
In 1927, William Durant, an automobile legend turned speculator, took an interest in a young 
company, Radio Corporation of America.  He noted that the bulk of the shares issued by RCA were held 
by RCA itself, General Electric, Westinghouse, and several other big corporations, and these shares were 
not traded.  In addition, there was much hype on the market for RCA, since its radio transmission was 
considered a revolution in communications technology at the time.  Thus Durant started a pool to 
accumulate the RCA stock.  As a result of the feverish purchases by the Durant group, they soon bought 
almost all floating shares as well as shares sold short.  Their trading generated daily turnover of above 
500,000 shares, while officially there were only 400,000 floating available.  The pool forced the market 
into a technical corner in March 1928.  The corner was unintentional because a large part of the shares 
was not under the control of the manipulators and they never call for a settlement.  From March 12th, the 
bears started struggling to settle their accounts and the price rose more than $61 in four days.  
 
                                                 
29 Brooks (1969). 
30 Thomas (1989). 
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XIV. The Silver Corner31 (1980) 
In 1974, Bunker and Herbert Hunt, children of the Texas oil magnate H.L. Hunt, started investing 
in silver as a hedge against inflation.  As they controlled more and more of the world's silver, the price 
shot up from $11 an ounce to more than $50.  To alleviate speculation on the New York Metals Market, 
The New York Commodities Exchange (COMEX) changed its trading rule by placing a 500 contract limit 
that traders may hold.  Afterwards, as silver prices slid, the Hunt brothers failed to meet huge margin call 
on their futures contracts, sparking a panic on commodity and futures exchanges and a 50% plunge of 
prices from $21.62 to $10.80 on March 27, 1980.  Later, former Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul 
Volcker estimated that 'at one point' during this winter Hunt-related interests may have controlled two-
thirds of the 170 million ounces of US silver stocks.  He also reported to Congress that the Hunt brothers 
were seeking more than $1 billion to help them restructure their silver trading debts in April 1980. 
                                                 
31  Dow Jones New Service, 4/30/1980, “Volcker Says Hunts Seeking Over $1 Billion For Silver Debts” and “Volcker 
Discloses Hunt Silver Debts”. 
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Appendix B: Price and Volume Chart of Well Known Market Corners 
    
Figure 1A. 
 
Company: Harlem, Corner Date: 08/24/1863
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Figure 2A. 
 
Company: Harlem, Corner Date: 05/17/1864
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
02
/29
/18
64
03
/05
/18
64
03
/10
/18
64
03
/15
/18
64
03
/19
/18
64
03
/24
/18
64
03
/30
/18
64
04
/04
/18
64
04
/09
/18
64
04
/14
/18
64
04
/19
/18
64
04
/23
/18
64
04
/28
/18
64
05
/03
/18
64
05
/07
/18
64
05
/12
/18
64
05
/17
/18
64
05
/21
/18
64
05
/26
/18
64
06
/01
/18
64
06
/06
/18
64
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Volume
High
Low
Close
 
 36  
Figure 3A. 
 
Company: Prairie du Chien, Corner Date: 11/06/1865
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Figure 4A. 
 
Company: Michigan Southern, Corner Date: 04/04/1866
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Figure 5A. 
Company: Erie Railroads, Corner Date: 3/10/1868
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Figure 6A. 
Company: Erie Railroads, Corner Date: 11/16/1868
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Figure 7A. 
American Gold Coin, Corner Date: 09/24/1869
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Figure 8A. 
 
Company: Northwestern, Corner Date: 11/23/1872
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Figure 9A. 
Company: Erie Railroad, Corner Date: 09/17/1872
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Figure 10A. 
Company: Northern Pacific, Corner Date: 05/09/1901
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Figure 11A. 
 
Company: Stutz Motor, Corner Date: 04/26/1920
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
12
/23
/19
19
12
/30
/19
19
1/6
/19
20
1/1
3/1
92
0
1/2
0/1
92
0
1/2
7/1
92
0
2/3
/19
20
2/1
0/1
92
0
2/1
7/1
92
0
2/2
4/1
92
0
3/2
/19
20
3/9
/19
20
3/1
6/1
92
0
3/2
3/1
92
0
3/3
0/1
92
0
4/6
/19
20
4/1
3/1
92
0
4/2
0/1
92
0
4/2
7/1
92
0
5/4
/19
20
5/1
1/1
92
0
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Volume
High
Low
Close
 
Figure 12A. 
 
Company: Piggly Wiggly, Corner Date: 03/20/1923
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 Figure 13A. 
 
Company: RCA, Corner Date: 3/12/1928
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Figure 14A. 
NYMEX Silver Futures 5000 Oz Contracts, Corner Date: 03/28/1980
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